The nonprofit Urban Institute is dedicated to elevating the debate on social and economic policy. For nearly five decades, Urban scholars have conducted research and offered evidence-based solutions that improve lives and strengthen communities across a rapidly urbanizing world. Their objective research helps expand opportunities for all, reduce hardship among the most vulnerable, and strengthen the effectiveness of the public sector.
The Impact of Higher Interest Rates on the Mortgage Market
Over the past 35 years, we have witnessed a secular decline in interest rates. After peaking at over 15 percent in 1981, the 10-year Treasury note traded at 1.83 percent before the presidential election in November 2016 (figure 1). Similarly, primary mortgage rates-the rate borrowers pay to take out a new 30-year fixed-rate mortgage-fell from over 18 percent in 1981 to 3.54 percent before the 2016 election. In July 2017, as we are preparing this paper, rates are up, with the 10-year Treasury note trading 44 basis points (bps) higher in yield and the rates on 30-year mortgages up 49 bps since November 2016. How much mortgage rates will rise is unclear, but the secular decline in rates is over. The Federal
Reserve has raised rates three times since the financial crisis and has announced plans for winding down their $1.78 trillion mortgage portfolio and their $2.45 trillion Treasury portfolio.
This paper identifies and examines six impacts on the mortgage market from the end of the secular decline in interest rates:
1. Mortgage origination volumes will decrease.
2.
The decline in origination volumes will lower profitability, spurring industry consolidation.
3. Prepayment speeds will slow because of three effects: the decrease in refinanceability, the lock-in effect, and the secular decline in mobility. This third effect is difficult to capture in models, as we have not had a sustained period of rate increases during the past 35 years.
4.
Home prices will increase. The stronger economy and higher inflation will be positive for home prices, and while the decline in affordability is a challenge for the market, homes are still affordable nationwide in a historical context. We believe the first two effects will dominate.
5. First-time homebuyer activity will increase while repeat buyers will continue to languish.
6. We could see the return of second liens, which were made extinct in the wake of the financial crisis.
Mortgage Origination Volumes Will Decline
Interest rates peaked in 1981 and have since declined. Periods of rate increases have been short lived.
The prepayment option for mortgages has been repeatedly exercised, resulting in a reshaping of the mortgage universe. The weighted average outstanding coupon has gone from 7.65 percent in 1999 to 4.17 percent in 2017 (figure 2). If we assume refinancing requires a 75 basis point differential between the new primary mortgage rate and the note rate for an outstanding mortgage, approximately 18 percent of the current 30-year mortgage universe is refinanceable. We calculate the 75 bps from Bankrate data indicating the average borrower will pay fees of $2,100 on a $200,000 loan, not including title search fees or title insurance. 1 If we add 1 percent for title search and title insurance, the total required up front to refinance a $200,000 loan is 2.05 percent, or about 52 bps in outright costs. In addition, the borrower needs to save at least 25 bps because of the hassle factor. This may overstate the refinanceability of the current market because rates have been so low for so long that borrowers who are most willing to refinance have likely already done so. The current These numbers are higher than our refinanceable share, as people refinance for reasons other than to save on a first mortgage (e.g., cash-out refinancing for home renovation, debt consolidation). Weighted average outstanding coupon Percentage refinanceable Profitability Will Decline, and Industry Consolidations Will Continue
The drop in mortgage refinancing will also affect profitability. Originators are most profitable during refinance waves, when they are capacity constrained. As interest rates decline and borrowers refinance, it is unnecessary to reduce rates in line with the market, so originators can increase their spreads and still secure sufficient business volume. In contrast, when rates increase, competitive pressures force originators to raise mortgage rates as little as possible to maintain market share. Holdings will increase its mortgage origination activity. in rates on the horizon complete their refinancing. Figure 5 shows aggregate prepayment speeds from 2010 to 2017. These speeds have a heavy seasonal factor (higher speeds in the summer and lower speeds in the winter), which partially masks the slowdown. This drop does not fully reflect the lock-in effect that will become more evident if rates continue to rise. For example, borrowers who have a 3.5 percent mortgage will be reluctant to move simply to buy a home with an extra bedroom if it means their mortgage rate will increase to 4.5 or 5.0 percent. They are more likely to stay where they are and either forgo the extra bedroom or add on to their current home. Borrowers stay in their home longer during periods of higher rates (figure 6). Comparing mortgage rates at the property purchase date and the property sale date using property records data, CoreLogic found that when rates were 1.5 percent lower than at the point of origination, one-quarter of owners resold their home within five years, but when rates were 1.5 percent higher, it took about a year longer for one-quarter of owners to resell. The third contributor to decreased prepayment speeds (after decreased refinancability and the lock-in effect) is the general declining mobility of US households. US households have experienced a secular decline in mobility for owners and renters since the 1980s ( figure 7 ). This has been well documented by Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak (2011) , who show the decline since 1980 occurs among all age groups and all races and ethnicities. Although several factors contribute to this decline, including the rise of dual-career families and some ability to work remotely, these factors fail to explain the extent of the decline.
It is difficult to know how big an impact this roughly 50 percent decline in mobility will have because there are not enough periods of rising rates in the past four decades to create prepayment models that capture this effect. These prepayment speeds could be slower than predicted by most prepayment models. Mortgages may be held longer and become longer-duration instruments than is being captured by traditional prepayment models. This is not a judgement. We are pointing out a modeling issue. The new secular decline in geographic mobility is hard to detect through prepayment modeling. If mortgages become longer-duration instruments than models predict, rate increases could create a larger mortgage sell-off than anticipated. 
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Home Prices Are Expected to Increase
Higher interest rates have several effects on home prices. First, higher rates are generally associated with a stronger economy. That means wages are generally rising, making that home more affordable, and borrowers are more confident about their job status, making them more willing to borrow to buy a home. In addition, higher interest rates are often associated with inflationary periods, during which real assets, such as homes, rise in value. Offsetting this, higher interest rates mean higher monthly payments, which crimps affordability. And with lower affordability, home price increases would be muted.
Higher interest rates are generally positive for home prices, despite decreasing affordability. Even though nominal home prices continued to rise as rates rose, the real home price appreciation, calculated by deflating home price increases by actual inflation, is more modest. From 1976 to 1981, the high nominal interest rates reflected high realized inflation and inflationary expectations. Real home prices were negative.
Regarding affordability, higher interest rates mean higher payments. But today's low interest rates make mortgages affordable in a historical context. Figure 9 shows the maximum home price families could afford, assuming they spend 28 percent of their income on housing-related expenses. Housingrelated expenses include a 20 percent down payment, a 30-year mortgage at the prevailing PMMS rate, and taxes and insurance at an additional 1. National affordability is, of course, different than local affordability. Some areas, particularly cities in California (e.g., Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Jose), are significantly less affordable than they were from 2000 to 2003, while other areas (e.g., Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, and Pittsburgh) are significantly more affordable.
As rates rise, home prices are likely to continue to rise nationwide, causing new homebuyers to confront higher prices and higher interest payments. Even if wages and incomes rise as quickly as home prices (historically, they have not), the effect of higher rates alone means homebuyers are likely to spend a higher share of their income on mortgage payments.
Home price increases are a double-edged sword. On one hand, strong home price growth allows households to build wealth and accumulate equity to move to a larger home or one in a better school district. Home equity is the largest source of wealth for most Americans (JCHS 2015, appendix table W-2). On the other hand, strong home price growth and higher interest rates make homeownership less affordable for households who are not homeowners. And in a tight credit environment, this translates into lower future homeownership rates (Goodman, Pendall, and Zhu 2015) .
Repeat Homebuyers Will Continue to Languish
Although the perception is that first-time homebuyer activity is down, repeat homebuyers are actually faring worse. Figure 10 The basic strategy for buying a starter home is to establish a strong credit history, have stable income, and save enough money for a down payment. Tight credit makes qualifying for the loan trickier, but for a borrower with reliable employment, scraping together the down payment is feasible.
Traditionally, borrowers used the equity in their starter home to put down a larger down payment on their second home. But under current conditions, less equity has been built up. Moreover, real incomes have been flat, making it difficult to make that larger monthly payment.
The situation is likely to get worse. As rates rise, the lock-in effect will further depress the repeat homebuyer market, as current homeowners stay where they are to keep their current mortgage rates.
The Second-Lien Market May Return
If borrowers are less prone to move and more prone to remodel their home, where will they obtain the funds for remodeling? As rates drop, creating refinance wave after refinance wave, many borrowers use cash-out refinancing. First-time homebuyers Repeat homebuyers First-time homebuyer share (%)
In a rising-rate environment, refinancing is no longer economically favorable, but a cash-out refinance may be. If a borrower needs 10 percent of the value of their home, they can keep their 3.5 percent mortgage and take out credit card debt at 18 percent, or they can refinance their mortgage to 4 percent plus 50 bps in costs. In this instance, the cash-out refinance is the cheaper alternative. The latest Freddie Mac cash-out refinance data from the first quarter of 2017 suggest 49 percent of refinancings were cash out, with the borrower increasing the loan amount at least 5 percent through the refinance. 4 But if rates rise another 200 bps, credit card debt looks more appealing, but credit card debt is expensive. We would expect to see the emergence of a second-lien market, with rates higher than for first-lien mortgages but below the rate for credit card debt.
Second-lien debt has a horrible reputation thanks to the financial crisis. Second liens were used for borrowers with high loan-to-value ratios, with the ratios calculated off inflated appraisals. But the problem was not with the instrument, but with how it was used. Texas prohibited second mortgages if the loan-to-value ratio of the first and the second was above 80 percent, and, consequently, second liens in Texas performed well.
We would expect to see the return of this market, as it is a valuable product in a rising-rate environment.
Conclusion
The end of the 35-year secular decline in interest rates has profound implications for the mortgage market. Higher rates will alter the mortgage landscape in these six dimensions:
1. Mortgage origination volumes will decline.
2. Profitability will decline, and industry consolidations will continue.
3. Prepayment speeds will slow.
4.
Home prices will generally increase.
5.
Repeat homebuyers will continue to languish.
6. The second-lien market may return.
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